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Abstract 
 
How do rankings affect demand? This paper investigates the impact of college rankings, and the 
visibility of those rankings, on students’ application decisions. Using natural experiments from 
U.S. News and World Report College Rankings, we present two main findings. First, we identify 
a causal impact of rankings on application decisions. When explicit rankings of colleges are 
published in U.S. News, a one-rank improvement leads to a 1-percentage-point increase in the 
number of applications to that college. Second, we show that the response to the information 
represented in rankings depends on the way in which that information is presented. Rankings 
have no effect on application decisions when colleges are listed alphabetically, even when 
readers are provided data on college quality and the methodology used to calculate rankings. 
This finding provides evidence that the salience of information is a central determinant of a 
firm’s demand function, even for purchases as large as college attendance.  
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1. Introduction 
A central assumption in industrial organization is that people optimize consumption 
decisions with respect to the price and quality of a good.  In practice, product quality often has 
countless dimensions, which can make the decision process difficult.  A growing literature has 
shown, furthermore, that consumers do not use all available information (Dellavigna and Pollet, 
2007, 2010); instead, the decision depends on the simplicity of calculating the information of 
interest, or the “salience” of that information.3  In particular, the salience of tax systems has been 
shown to affect demand elasticity with respect to tax rates (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009) 
even though, from a neoclassical perspective, responses to salient tax rates and opaque tax rates 
should be equivalent.  A related literature shows that information aggregation is valuable to 
consumers with limited attention (Pope, 2009; Luca, 2010).  Despite the growing evidence that 
consumers do not use all available information, intuition may continue to suggest that consumers 
are more likely to be attentive when making larger purchases.  For example, the theory proposed 
by Chetty et al. (2009) predicts that consumers are more likely to pay attention to opaque details 
(in their case, taxes) when “making large, one time choices (e.g., buying a house) than when 
making small, repeated purchases (e.g., food, clothing).”       
We investigate whether the salience of product-quality information affects demand in a 
setting where consumers choose among many options to make a large one-time investment: 
college.  Empirically, we exploit a natural experiment to determine whether the U.S. News and 
World Report College Rankings (hereafter referred to as USNWR) has a larger impact on student 
application decisions when rankings are more salient.  In our context, salience is defined in terms 
of the simplicity of determining a given college’s ranking.  Thus if USNWR explicitly published 
a ranking, it would be more salient than if USNWR published only the underlying quality and a 
methodology for computing the ranking. Publishing rankings makes them less costly for 
applicants to compute, and also makes the information more readily visible.   
  We perform our analysis in two steps.  First, we identify the causal impact of USNWR 
rank on equilibrium applications.  Hence we can treat rank as a dimension of quality that college 
applicants value.  Second, we show that application elasticity with respect to rankings is affected 
by the salience of the ranking system.  The existing literature on salience is primarily focused on 
taxation (and hence elasticity with respect to price changes), but we show that salience also 
affects responsiveness to quality information.  We also show that salience is important for large 
one-time purchases. 
  USNWR is an important setting in which to study the impact of salience on demand.  It 
has become the dominant source of college rankings for schools, students, and news outlets.  In 
2007, within three days of publishing the rankings, the USNWR website received 10 million 
views, as compared to the typical month's 500,000 views.4  Magazine sales often double relative 
to other months.  Given both the importance of college choice and the substantial influence of 
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USNWR, the impact and salience of its rankings are of direct interest.  More generally, the 
impact on a firm's demand function of information and of how that information is presented is a 
central question in industrial organization.  
  An existing literature on college rankings has investigated USNWR. Monks and 
Ehrenberg (1999) show a correlation between rankings and application decisions, but do not 
distinguish changes in rank from changes in school quality.  Meredith (2004) uses a similar 
strategy but focuses on differential effects by quality tiers for a broader set of schools. Griffith 
and Rask (2007) use student-level data to show the effect of rankings on matriculation decisions; 
Bowman and Bastedo (2009) show the nonlinear effect of several outcome variables on being 
ranked in the top 50. Our paper provides further evidence of the causal impact of rankings on 
application decisions, and it is the first publication to examine the salience of rankings. 
To identify the causal impact of rankings, we exploit several methodological changes 
made by USNWR.  In the 1990s, USNWR changed its ranking methodology six times.  During 
that period, a school's ranking could move up or down from one year to the next without any 
accompanying change in objective quality measures.  A striking example is the California 
Institute of Technology, whose rank rose from ninth in 1998 to first in 1999 entirely due to a 
change in methodology.5  Controlling for the underlying quality of schools, we find that an 
exogenous one-rank improvement leads to a 0.96-2.07 percent increase in applicants.  We take 
this as evidence that USNWR has a causal impact on students’ preferences.  Our estimates 
reinforce the significant evidence that rankings themselves have a causal impact on application 
decisions. Pope (2009) finds consistent results when using hospital rankings. 
If we treat a school's rank as a quality dimension to which students assign value, we can 
then test the impact of the salience of quality disclosure. To do so, we exploit a natural 
experiment. Prior to 1995, schools ranked 26-50 were pooled as “second-tier,” while the “first-
tier” schools were assigned explicit ordinal ranks from 1 to 25.  After 1995, “second-tier” 
schools also assigned an explicit ordinal rank from 26-50.  In other words, schools 26-50 were 
listed alphabetically before 1995 and listed according to rank after that year. Hence, rankings are 
more salient when they are explicitly listed numerically than when the schools are listed 
alphabetically. If salience matters, the impact of rankings on applications should increase when 
ranks are explicit. 
To test for salience, we begin by constructing rankings using the underlying data and 
weights available to readers of USNWR. True rank cannot be perfectly predicted because 
USNWR does not publish faculty salaries, which affect rank.  Furthermore, weights are only 
published for certain broad categories, which can consist of several pieces of information.6 For 
example, “selectivity rank’ consists of SAT /ACT scores of incoming students, the proportion of 
enrolled freshmen who were in the top 10 percent of their high-school class, and the admissions 
acceptance rate. USNWR used a consistent method to construct rankings for all schools in all 
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years; the only difference between the alphabetically-ordered regime and the rank-ordered 
regime is that the latter makes the rankings visible and thus more salient. We find that when the 
rankings are opaque (the alphabetical regime), they have no significant impact on application 
decisions. Salient rankings, by contrast, have a large impact. Hence the impact of rankings 
depends not just on their informational content but also on their salience. We show that this 
result is robust to many alternative methods of constructing rankings and to other robustness 
checks. 
Overall, our results suggest some facts about quality disclosure that run counter to 
standard intuition.  Standard models to the contrary, elasticity with respect to quality changes 
does not depend solely on preferences and information availability; it also depends on how that 
information is presented.  While salient rankings have a very large impact on demand, the same 
information presented in an opaque fashion has no impact on demand.  From a quality-disclosure 
perspective, providing more information to consumers can actually reduce responsiveness and 
thus undermine the purpose of disclosure. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data.  Section 3 presents the 
estimation strategy.  Section 4 presents the main results, and Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Data and Background 
USNWR has published a ranking of U.S. colleges and universities every year since 1983, 
with the exception of 1984.  Initially rankings were provided only for the top 13 universities, and 
they were based solely on a subjective survey of academics.  Today hundreds of schools are 
ranked or assigned to tiers on the basis of a detailed survey of both objective and subjective 
quality measures. Using this data, USNWR publishes three hierarchical levels of information: (1) 
quality of several vertical dimensions (e.g., faculty resources, peer assessment, SAT scores, etc.), 
(2) a cardinal quality score (normalized so that the top school has a score of 100) computed as a 
weighted average of the category scores, and (3) an ordinal ranking based on the cardinal quality 
score. 
In 1989 USNWR ranked the top 25 universities; the next 25 schools were listed 
alphabetically.  The underlying data was published for all schools, but the cardinal score and 
rank were only published for the top 25 schools.  In 1995 USNWR expanded its rankings to 
include the top 50 schools.  Thus schools 26-50, formerly listed alphabetically, began to be 
explicitly ranked; in both cases, the underlying information was published alongside the listings. 
In addition to expanding the rankings, USNWR also changed its ranking methodology (the 
weight assigned to each category) several times during the 1990s.  Thus a school’s rank could 
change from one year to the next even if no change in quality had occurred. 
Our dataset consists, first, of rankings and underlying information for the top 25 schools, 
according to the 1990 rankings, over the period 1990-2000.7  Furthermore, for several tests we 
use the entire set of top 50 schools, as determined in 1995; these schools are listed in Appendix 
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 We could have considered a larger set of schools, but this time period offers clear identification strategies for only 
the top-ranked schools. 
A, where the top 25 schools (in 1990) are denoted with an asterisk. The result is a nearly 
balanced panel.8 
USNWR is published in the fall and employs data collected the previous year.  Thus the 1999 
“Best Colleges” issue appeared in the fall of 1998 and used surveys and data from applicants and 
enrolled students for the 1997-1998 academic year. 
 
2.1. College Applications 
We focus here on the top 50 schools in the USNWR during the period 1990-2000.  These 
schools are highly competitive: on average, 72 percent of their applicants were in the top 10 
percent of their class, and the average SAT score was 1267.  The schools are also highly 
selective, accepting fewer than half of all applicants.  Though this group of schools does not 
represent the typical college-going population, it does make an interesting case study because 
such students presumably put a lot of effort into choosing a college.  We do not know how many 
applications each student in our sample submitted.  However, Smith (2011) shows that high-
school seniors apply to an average of approximately three colleges (conditional on applying to at 
least one).   
Some of our specifications use tier-1 schools as a control group for tier 2.  This might be 
problematic if applications to tier-1 schools trended differently from tier-2 schools.  Figure 1 
shows, however, that the two groups exhibit similar trends in application patterns during the 
period in question. 
 This is also a time in which applications became available over the internet and the 
Common Application went from 124 colleges to 209.9  Along with increased four-year college 
enrollment of approximately 9 percent (NCES 2002), potentially contribute to the increase in 
total number of applications seen in Figure 1.  Simultaneously, the internet reduced the 
circulation of USNWR but at the same time, allowed for online viewership. 
 
2.2. USNWR Quality Categories 
    The structure of the quality measures in USNWR is hierarchical.  Detailed information is 
aggregated into the following broad published variables: reputation rank, selectivity rank, 
faculty-resource rank, retention and graduation rank, financial-resources rank, and alumni-giving 
rank.10  The broad variables are treated as ordinal ranks; a ranking of 1 is the best possible 
outcome relative to all other schools surveyed, both in and out of the top 50.  Reputation rank is 
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 In certain years, some of these variables were not assigned an ordinal rank but instead a continuous quality 
measure.  We converted those continuous scores into ordinal ranks. 
determined by asking university presidents, provosts, and deans of admissions to rank other 
schools' reputations.  Selectivity rank is a linear combination of several more detailed variables, 
including SAT and ACT scores, the proportion of enrolled freshmen who were in the top 10 
percent of their high-school class, and the admissions acceptance rate.  Faculty-resource rank is 
based on the percent of classes with fewer than 20 students, the percent of classes with more than 
50 students, the percent of faculty with Ph.D.s, full-time faculty as a percentage of all faculty, 
and the student-faculty ratio. Retention and graduation rank are based respectively on the percent 
of freshmen who return the next year and the percent of students who graduate.  Financial-
resources rank is based on educational expenditures per student. Alumni-giving rank measures 
the percentage of alumni who donate.11 
    These broad categories are transparent and relatively constant over the period in question,12 
but the methodology underlying these categories has been neither constant nor completely 
transparent.  Therefore we primarily use the broad measures of quality but sometimes use the 
underlying measures.  A summary of all the variables, in which each observation represents a 
single school in a single year, appears in Table 1.  The number of applications is drawn from 
Peterson's Guide to Competitive Colleges. 
 
3. Estimation Strategy 
    This section describes our estimation of whether rankings enter into applicants' demand 
functions and whether the salience of rankings matters.  We first present the theoretical 
framework of the analysis, followed by the empirical identification strategies. 
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
    Consider the demand function ,  faced by a college of quality  and rank .  In this 
setting, the semi-elasticity 	,
 represents the percentage change in the number of applicants that 
results from a one-rank improvement.  This framework is similar to that used by Chetty et al. 
(2009), Finkelstein (2009), and Luca (2010).   We focus on how elasticity is affected by salience.  
We denote a salient ranking as  and an opaque ranking as .  By definition, a salient ranking 
is one that is easily noticed by applicants, and an opaque ranking is one that students have to 
compute using the weights provided by USNWR.  In the neoclassical full-optimization model, 
	,
 would not be affected by whether the ranking is salient or opaque. 
    Our goal is to test the full-optimization neoclassical theory that ,   , .  
Empirically, we do so in two steps.  First, we estimate whether rankings do indeed have a causal 
impact on applications, such that demand is in fact a function of rankings.  Second, we estimate 
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	,
  	,
.  The null hypothesis is that the neoclassical full optimization model holds and 
	,
  	,
  0.   
 
3.2 Identification Strategies 
 
3.2.1 Causal Impact of Rankings 
    Our first objective is to test whether rankings have a causal impact on student choice.  To do 
so, we must distinguish the impact of changes in a school's underlying quality from the impact of 
changes in the school's rank.  Recall that a school's rank represents a weighted average of its 
performance on several dimensions of quality, and that the weights are chosen by USNWR.  If 
the weights were constant over time, rank would be collinear with quality changes.  However, 
USNWR changes the weights from year to year, making for plausibly exogenous variation in a 
school's rank.  A complete list of methodology changes appears in Appendix B.  Largely 
following Pope (2009), we exploit these USNWR methodology changes to pinpoint variation in 
rank with no underlying quality changes. This procedure allows us to estimate the causal impact 
of rankings on number of applications. 
    If students use only USNWR to obtain information about underlying school quality, we should 
see no response to rank once we control for the underlying categories.  Let schools be indexed j 
and time be indexed t; then this section's main specification for estimating demand is as follows: 
 
 , 
   
         
 
where  ,   is demand measured by logarithm of number of applications in year t+1, and 
 and T are school and year fixed effects respectively, and  is a school-year-specific 
idiosyncratic error term.  Also,  is the vector of broad categories in USNWR, or quality 
measures of school j.  This section tests whether the coefficient on rank, , is statistically 
different than zero.  If we can reject the null hypothesis of   0, then rank enters the demand 
for a school. 
    However, it is possible that quality measures are imperfectly measured, causing rank to be 
correlated with the error term.  To control for this endogeneity, we take an instrumental variables 
approach.  For years in which the formula changed, we use the previous year's methodology to 
predict rank in the absence of a methodology change.  Then the difference between the predicted 
rank and the actual rank is calculated.  This difference is untainted by changes in school quality 
that may be imperfectly controlled for in previous regressions. Using the difference to instrument 
for actual rank will isolate out the portion of the rank change caused by the exogenous change in 
ranking methodology, as opposed to an improvement in school quality. 
More formally, the instruments must satisfy the relevance condition and the exclusion 
restriction.  The difference between predicted rank and actual rank certainly satisfies the 
relevance condition, as larger differences are associated with larger values of the potentially 
endogenous rank.  The exclusion restriction is also likely to be satisfied because the difference 
between predicted and actual rank should have no effect on applications, other than via the 
endogenous variable.  One potential violation of the exclusion restriction would occur if 
USNWR anticipated changes in student preferences and acted accordingly.  However, though we 
exploit methodology changes to estimate the rank effect, the test for salience further reinforces 
the causal interpretation.  In order for salience of rankings to have an effect, it must first be 
assumed that rankings have an effect and that this identification does not rely on exogenous 
methodology changes. 
In addition to testing how rank affects the number of applications, we also test for its 
effect on acceptance rate, yield,13 average SAT of enrollees, and percentage of enrollees in the 
top 10 percent of their high-school class. 
 
3.2.2 Salience 
In this section, we aim to estimate the impact of salience of ranking on the elasticity of 
demand with respect to ranking.  We use the 1995 expansion of rankings (from top 25 to top 50) 
as an identification strategy. Recall that in 1995 tier-2 schools (ranked 26-50), which had 
previously been listed alphabetically (opaque ranking), began to be explicitly ranked (salient 
ranking).  Both before and after the methodology change, USNWR reported the weights assigned 
to each broad category; thus any applicant who thought that the weights conveyed meaningful 
information could have made use of them before 1995.  Empirically, if salience of rank has an 
effect on applications, the demand elasticity with respect to rank should increase when rank 
becomes salient.  Our identification strategy is to compare the demand elasticity before and after 
rank was explicitly listed for each school.  We run several variants of this test to show that the 
result is robust to different specifications. 
In an experimental setting, a test for salience would be immediate.  We would simply 
provide the control group with the underlying categories and the weights to apply to each, which 
they could then use to construct rankings if they thought that doing so would be useful.  We 
would provide the treatment group with the same information, but would also provide them the 
rankings so that they would not have to compute them themselves.  Our market setting deviates 
from the experimental ideal in that USNWR publishes most but not all of the underlying 
categories.  Specifically, it does not publish faculty resources, which is based on faculty salaries.  
The weights of multiple detailed sub-categories are also excluded.  For instance, the broad 
category “selectivity rank” consists of acceptance rates and students’ high-school achievement, 
but only the weight for “selectivity rank” is published, not the weights of the underlying 
information.  Hence we must develop a test of salience that is robust to this shortcoming. 
To construct rank prior to 1995, we regress tier-1 ranks on observable school data and use 
the coefficient estimates to impute rank.14  While this procedure deviates from the experimental 
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 We can also manually construct ranks using published weights for broad categories, and can try different sub-
weights for data within broad categories.  Running a regression produces similar results for rank. 
 
ideal, our identification strategy leads to an unbiased estimated impact of salience.  Essentially, 
any potential bias would arise from the fact that we are comparing the impact of estimated 
rankings in the opaque regime to actual rankings in the salient regime.  To the extent that the 
actual rankings contain no noise while the estimated rankings contain noise, our estimated 
impact of salience would conflate the impact of salience with the impact of reducing 
measurement error.  To eliminate this bias, we then use a consistent approach to estimating ranks 
for both the salient and opaque regimes.  By introducing the same methodology (and hence the 
same measurement error) into the salient regime that is contained in the opaque regime, we 
increase the standard errors but are able to recover an unbiased estimate of how salience affects 
demand elasticity with respect to rank.  We estimate the rankings by applying the category 
weights to the available data.  This procedure shows what the rankings would be net of the 
missing data.  After constructing hypothetical ranks, we eliminated all schools that had changed 
tiers (up or down) in 1994 just prior to the expansion of rankings.15 Doing so eliminates the 
possibility that students knew whether or not a school was on the cusp of a tier.16   
Our first empirical test is to see whether the effect of rank on applications differs when it 
is salient from when it is opaque.  To do so, we run a school and year fixed effects regression of 
logarithm of number of applications on rank and rank interacted with a salience indicator while 
controlling for underlying quality measures, including average SAT of enrollees, percentage in 
the top 10 percent of their high-school class, and graduation rate.17  A rank is defined as salient 
and equal to one when it is explicit and as equal to zero when listed alphabetically.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term is testing the theoretical hypothesis that the elasticities of rank 
depend differently in the presence of saliency, or mathematically, 	,
  	,
  0. 
This strategy may be problematic if the rank effect is larger for tier-1 schools than for tier 
2.  To show that this possibility is not driving our results, we restrict our attention solely to tier-2 
schools.  Specifically, we look at how the elasticity with respect to rank changes for tier-2 
schools after rank becomes salient.  Again, the null is that 	,
  	,
  0.   
A final issue with the identification strategy is that the impact of rank could be growing over 
time, which might cause elasticity to increase irrespective of salience.  To control for a potential 
underlying trend in elasticity with respect to rank, we take a differences-in-differences approach.  
Specifically, we test whether the elasticity 	,
 
 
  	,
  
  	,
 
 
 
	,
  
   0.    
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 We also try a more conservative estimate by dropping schools that jumped tiers anytime between 1990 and 1994.  
Because it seems unlikely that students look at the rankings so many years prior to their application year, we do not 
prefer this specification. Regardless, it does not qualitatively change results. 
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 Tier-2 schools could be on the cusp of jumping either to tier 1 or to tier 3 (ranked above 50). 
17
 These underlying quality measures are heavily weighted and present in all years for tier-1 and tier-2 schools.  
Moreover, they are good proxies for school quality. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Rank Effect: Methodology Changes 
Table 2 presents results from regressing logarithm of number of applications on rank and 
school-quality measures.  Using the full sample for 1990-2000, OLS results show that a one-rank 
drop is associated with 0.96 percent fewer applicants. Even when changes in rankings reflect 
only methodology changes, applicants respond to a decline in rank. 
To check the robustness of this result, the next two columns break the data into years 
with and without methodology changes.  If the rank effect is driven by nonlinear responses to 
quality, the rank effect should appear in both sub-samples.  In fact, however, there is no rank 
effect in years without methodology changes; there is a rank effect, estimated to be 
approximately -0.02, in the sub-sample with methodology changes.  Since the full sample's 
estimate of rank effect is a weighted combination of these two sub-samples, it makes sense that 
the estimate is in between; the estimate is probably muted by the lack of identification in the 
years without methodology changes. 
Table 3 shows results from instrumental variables.  As shown, the coefficient on rank 
equals -0.0207 and is statistically significant.  That this number is more than twice the size of the 
OLS result is not very surprising.  Given the local average treatment effect interpretation, the 
schools that are most affected by methodology changes are those that exhibit larger changes in 
number of applications.  Table 3 also presents the first stage. 
Given the similarity of the sub-sample and instrumental variables, and accounting for 
issues in the full sample estimates, the true rank effect may be closer to 2 percent than to the 
OLS estimate of 0.96 percent.  Moreover, all specifications yield the result that students consider 
rankings, beyond their informational content, when deciding where to apply to college.18 
Looking at the USNWR rankings but not using this identification strategy, Monks and 
Ehrenberg (1999) and Bastedo and Bowman (2009) find a correlation between rankings and 
applications.  This correlation is stronger for schools ranked 1-25 than for schools ranked 26-50.  
Using the same identification strategy in a hospital setting, Pope (2009) finds that an “average 
hospital experiences a 5 percent change in non-emergency, Medicare patient volume from year 
to year due to rank changes.”  Our first result is similar to this, but in an education setting.   
 
 
4.1.1 Alternative Dependent Variables   
Table 4 presents the same OLS and 2SLS regressions as Table 3 but uses several 
different outcome variables: acceptance rate, yield, average SAT of enrollees, and percentage of 
enrollees in the top 10 percent of their high-school class.  The impact of rankings on acceptance 
rates is positive and significant.  When a school increases in rank (ranked relatively worse), its 
acceptance rate increases.  This result is consistent with the impact on the number of 
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results are consistent with Tables 2 and 3. 
applications, since the denominator of acceptance rate is the number of applications.  The 
remaining outcome variables attempt to characterize the composition of enrollees.  There is no 
significant relationship between rankings and yield, average SATs, or percentage of enrollees in 
the top 10 percent of their high-school class.   
Data availability limits our analysis of the quality of applicants: ultimately, average SAT 
and percent of students in the top 10 percent of their class are very coarse measures of quality.  
Hence we are cautious in interpreting these non-results. 
 
4.1.2 Control Variables 
Our estimation strategy allows us to identify the causal impact of rankings on 
applications, but does not allow us to identify the impact of underlying categories.  The main 
explanation is that the underlying measures of quality could be correlated (positively or 
negatively) with other measures of quality that are observed by students but not by the 
econometrician.  For example, one possible reason for the positive coefficient on faculty 
resources is that increases in faculty resources divert resources from other offerings that are of 
interest to applicants. 
 
4.2 Salience: Expansion of Rankings 
 
The first set of results on salience is presented in Table 5, which regresses logarithm of 
number of applications on rank, whether or not the ranking is salient, and the interaction of the 
two, while controlling for school and year fixed effects and several underlying quality measures.  
Method 1 estimates rank for tier-2 schools in 1990-1994, but uses the available rank for tier-1 
and tier-2 schools after 1994.  Method 2 uses estimates of rank for both tiers in all years. 
In both specifications, the coefficient on rank is small and insignificant, but the 
interaction of salience and rank is estimated to be between -0.0082 and -0.0108.  Moreover, a 
Wald Test on whether the sum of the two coefficients is different than zero can be rejected.  
Thus only when rankings are salient does a one-rank improvement lead to an increase of 0.55-
0.71 percent in applications.19  Thus rank affects application decisions only when it is salient, a 
somewhat surprising finding given the magnitude of the decision about which college to attend.  
Appendices C-1 and C-2 shows the different ordering of tier 2 schools before and after the 
expansion, respectively. 
The remaining results show the robustness of the salience effect.  Table 6 again estimates 
the impact of salience but only includes tier-2 schools, which are subject to the regime change.  
Using the same two methods to construct rank, again only salient rankings affect application 
decisions.  The strongly negative and significant coefficient on rank and an indicator for whether 
rankings are salient is between -0.0074 and -0.0103.  Hence, when the rank is opaque, it has no 
                                                            
19
 These results are the sum of the two coefficients (e.g., -0.0055 = -0.0082+0.0027). 
 
impact; however, a one-rank improvement increases applications by approximately 0.8 percent 
when the ranking is salient. 
Table 7 uses a differences-in-differences approach to make sure that the salience result in 
Table 6 is not being driven by an underlying trend in responsiveness to rank.  In this case, tier 2 
is compared to tier-1 schools over the two time periods.  Supporting the salience hypothesis, rank 
only matters when it is visible alongside the underlying data and methodology.  In both 
specifications, salience increases demand elasticity by at least 0.72. 
This section has shown that the elasticity of demand with respect to a school's rank is 
determined almost exclusively by the salience of that rank.  We firmly reject the hypothesis that 
how quality information is displayed has no impact on the elasticity.  The null hypothesis is 
rejected for at least one quality dimension of one of the largest purchases many people make.  
This finding adds to our understanding of salience, by showing that salience matters not 
just with regard to prices and taxes, but also to understanding the quality of a good.  It also 
shows that salience matters in very large one-time purchases, which is precisely where the 
literature has cast doubt.   
In our setting, as well as the tax setting, these salience effects occur when information is 
more visible to decision-makers.  In our paper, as well as Chetty (2009), salience is defined in 
terms of the cost of processing information.  Hence, applying weights to information makes it 
more salient.  In contrast with the tax case, however, it is unclear how information should be 
aggregated in the college choice problem.  We abstract from this issue in our paper.  
 
5. Discussion 
This paper has presented two main findings.  First, U.S. News and World Report College 
Rankings has a causal impact on application decisions.  Second, the demand elasticity with 
respect to the rankings is affected by the salience of the ranking.  These findings contribute to 
two separate strands in the literature.  First, they enrich the literature on the effects of the 
USNWR College Rankings.  The existing literature has shown a strong correlation between 
rankings and demand, but our findings provide further support for the hypothesis that these 
rankings have a causal impact on students' application decisions.  Second, this paper contributes 
to the literature on salience.  Conventional wisdom to the contrary, salience has a large effect on 
one of the largest investments most people make in their lifetimes, namely where they choose to 
go to college. 
This paper has several limitations, which we hope will be addressed in future research.   
 
5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
We have isolated the causal effect of USNWR, and shown that the response differs 
depending on how information is presented.  One limitation of this paper is that we do not fully 
address why students rely on rankings. Rankings may serve as a simplifying tool for applicants, 
reducing the time and effort required to sort through the pertinent information, or even providing 
guidance on which information is important.  However, rankings could have an effect even if the 
underlying information were not important.  Specifically, students may choose a highly ranked 
school primarily in order to signal their ability.   
Understanding which of these two mechanisms is most relevant is important from both a 
policy and an information-design perspective.  If rankings are primarily a simplification tool, the 
choice of weights is critical from a policy perspective; incorrect weights could lead to severe 
welfare losses.  If, on the other hand, rankings simply help students signal their ability, the 
choice of weights is unimportant—any arbitrary set of weights could enable students to 
coordinate with future employers.  Though beyond the scope of this paper, this is a promising 
area for future research. 
Another limitation of this paper is that we have not observed how students learn about the 
rankings.  Many students clearly read USNWR, but schools also use their rankings in 
advertisements and as a marketing device.  This phenomenon might play a non-trivial role in 
amplifying the rank effect by increasing the visibility of rankings to students.  We are unable to 
distinguish these effects. Future research could investigate this question and, more generally, the 
information-revelation strategies of universities.   
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Top 25 Schools, 1990-2000 (256 obs)*
Rank 12.6        7.8        1 33
Reputation Rank 12.2        9.5        1 55
Selectivity Rank 14.8        11.1      1 54
Faculty Resource Rank 18.9        16.8      1 97
Retention and Graduation Rank 17.0        13.2      1 72
Financial Resource Rank 17.9        14.3      1 64
Alumni Giving Rank** 31.1        35.1      1 165
Number of Applications 12,597    5,758    1,173 35,681 
Top 50 Schools, 1990-2000  (485 obs)***
Number of Applications 11,859    5,612    1,561 32,539 
Average SAT 1,267      105       1,015 1,515   
Top 10% of High-School Class 72           18         30      100      
Acceptance Rate 46           20         11      88        
Graduation Rate 81           11         47      97        
Table 1. Summary Statistics
***Because this category includes only schools consistently ranked in the  top 25 or consistently 
**Only 187 observations, because the variable was not introduced until 1993.
*As determined by 1990 rankings.
Variable Full Sample No Method Changes Method Changes
1990-2000 1996-1998 1991-1994
Rank -0.0096** 0.0030 -0.0187**
(0.0041) (0.0080) (0.0071)
Reputation Rank -0.0045 -0.0031 0.0055
(0.0034) (0.0064) (0.0043)
Selectivity Rank -0.0184*** -0.0124 -0.0054
(0.0020) (0.0093) (0.0036)
Faculty Resource Rank 0.0021*** -0.0016 0.0041***
(0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0010)
Retention and Graduation Rank -0.0002 -0.0115 0.0095***
(0.0015) (0.0077) (0.0034)
Financial Resource Rank -0.0012 0.0005 -0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0031)
Alumni Giving Rank -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0007*
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0004)
Observations 258 71 92
R-squared 0.976 0.992 0.991
Table 2. Rank Effect: Regressions on Quantity of Applicants, Top 25 Schools
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level, **  5% level, and *** 1% 
level.  Regression also controls for year and school fixed effects.
USNWR College Rankings, 1990-2000
Dependent Variable  = log (# of applications)
Variable OLS IV
Rank -0.0096** -0.0207***
(0.0041) (0.0058)
-- 0.5887***
-- (0.0528)
Observations 258 258
R-squared 0.976 0.975
First-Stage F-Statistic -- 642.71
1. Rank with previous year's methodology is predicted.
Table 3. Rank Effect: Regressions on Quantity of Applicants, Top  25 Schools
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level.  
Regression also controls for underlying categories and year and school fixed effects.
USNWR College Rankings, 1990-2000
Dependent Variable  = log (# of applications)
First-Stage Results
Difference between Rank and Rank with previous year's 
methodology1
Variable
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Rank -0.0096** -0.0207*** 0.0133** 0.0344*** -0.0877 -0.2086 -0.3914 -0.2758 0.0377 0.1649
(0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0086) (0.1414) (0.1575) (0.5163) (0.8696) (0.1316) (0.1801)
Instrument
-- 0.5939*** -- 0.5905*** -- 0.5967*** -- 0.5927*** -- 0.5905***
-- (0.0547) -- (0.0523) -- (0.0526) -- (0.0525) -- (0.0523)
Observations2 258 258 259 259 248 248 258 258 259 259
R-squared 0.976 0.975 0.934 0.929 0.959 0.958 0.980 0.980 0.944 0.944
First Stage F-Statistic -- 642.71 -- 642.65 -- 794.04 -- 629.53 -- 642.65
Alternative Dependent Variables
Table 4. Rank Effect: Regressions on Quantity of Applicants, Top 25 Schools
First-Stage Results
SAT
USNWR College Rankings, 1990-2000
Log (# of applications)
2. Numbers of observations differ because some college data was not published in some years.
Top 10% in High-School Class
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level.  Regression also controls for underlying categories and for year and school fixed effects.  Instruments are the difference between 
predicted rank using previous year's methodology and actual rank. 
Difference between Rank and Rank 
with previous year's methodology1
Acceptance Rate
Dependent Variable
Yield
1. Rank with previous year's methodology is predicted.
Variable Method 1 Method 2
Salient x Rank -0.0108*** -0.0082***
(0.0028) (0.0025)
Rank 0.0037 0.0027
(0.0023) (0.0025)
Observations 468 467
R-squared 0.955 0.954
Wald Test p-value (Rank + Salient x Rank = 0) 0.0004 0.0132
Table 5. Salience
USNWR College Rankings, Top 50 Schools
Expansion of Rankings
Dependent Variable = log (# of applications)
Notes: Results from OLS regressions using data from 1990-2000.  Salient x Rank implies that 
rank was shown explicitly, not listed alphabetically.  Second-tier schools were ranked 26-50 in 
1995.  Method 1 estimates second-tier ranks from 1990-1994 but uses actual rank for all other 
schools.  Method 2 estimates all rankings from 1990-2000.  Estimated ranks use OLS 
regression of Rank on school characteristics.  School and year fixed effects are included, as 
are controls for school quality that are present in all years.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level, **  5% level, and *** 1% level.
Variable Method 1 Method 2
Salience Effect: Post 1994 x Rank -0.0103*** -0.0074***
(0.0032) (0.0028)
Rank 0.0018 -0.0008
(0.0026) (0.0031)
Observations 216 215
R-squared 0.943 0.942
Wald Test p-value (Rank + Salience Effect = 0) 0.0019 0.0123
Notes: Results from OLS regressions.  Salient Effect implies thatrank was shown explicitly, 
not listed alphabetically.  Second-tier schools were ranked 26-50 in 1995.  Method 1 
estimates second-tier ranks from 1990-1994 but uses actual rank for all other schools.  
Method 2 estimates all rankings from 1990-2000.  Estimated ranks use OLS regression of 
Rank on school characteristics.  School and year fixed effects are included, as are controls 
for school quality that are present in all years.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * = 
significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level.
Table 6. Salience
USNWR College Rankings, Tier-2 Schools
Dependent Variable = log (# of applications)
Pre/Post Expansion
Variable Method 1 Method 2
Salience Effect: Post-1994 x Second Tier x Rank -0.0090*** -0.0072***
(0.0029) (0.0027)
Rank 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0020)
Second Tier 2.5830*** -0.3335***
(0.1194) (0.0363)
Post 1994 x Second Tier 0.3451*** 0.2722***
(0.1104) (0.1033)
Observations 468 467
R-squared 0.954 0.954
Wald Test p-value (Rank + Salience Effect = 0) 0.0008 0.0106
Table 7. Salience
Notes: Results from OLS regressions.  Salient Effect implies that rank was shown explicitly, not listed 
alphabetically.  Second-tier schools were ranked 26-50 in 1995.  Method 1 estimates second-tier ranks from 
1990-1994 but uses actual rank for all other schools.  Method 2 estimates all rankings from 1990-2000.  
Estimated ranks use OLS regression of Rank on school characteristics.  School and year fixed effects are 
included, as are controls for school quality that are present in all years.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* = significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level.
USNWR College Rankings, Top 50 Schools
Dependent Variable = log (# of applications)
Expansion of Rankings, Differences-in-Differences
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Figure 2: Coefficient Estimates of Rank Effect on Applications
By Year and Tier
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Ranked 1-25 Ranked 26-50
Brown University* Boston College
California Institute of Technology* Brandeis University
Carnegie Mellon University* Case Western Reserve Univ.
Columbia University* College of William and Mary
Cornell University* Georgia Institute of Technology
Dartmouth College* Lehigh University
Duke University* New York University
Emory University Pennsylvania State University--University Park
Georgetown University* Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Harvard University* Rutgers New Brunswick
Johns Hopkins University* Syracuse University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology* Tulane University
Northwestern University* University of Illinois--Urbana-Champaign
Princeton University* University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill*
Rice University* University of California--Los Angeles
Stanford University* University of California--San Diego
Tufts University University of Southern California
University of Chicago* University of Wisconsin--Madison
University of Michigan--Ann Arbor* University of California--Berkeley*
University of Notre Dame University of California--Davis
University of Pennsylvania* University of California--Irvine
University of Virginia* University of Florida
Vanderbilt University University of Rochester*
Washington University in St. Louis* University of Washington
Yale University* Wake Forest University
Appendix A: Top 50 Schools in 1995, USNWR
*Among the top 25 in 1990 rankings.
Year
Reputation 
Rank
Selectivity 
Rank
Faculty 
Resource 
Rank
Retention 
and 
Graduation 
Rank
Financial 
Resource 
Rank
Alumni 
Giving 
Rank
1990 25 25 25 5 20 0
1991 25 25 25 5 20 0
1992 25 25 25 7 18 0
1993 25 25 20 10 15 5
1994 25 25 20 15 10 5
1995 25 15 20 25 10 5
1996 25 15 20 25* 10 5
1997 25 15 20 25 10 5
1998 25 15 20 25 10 5
1999** 25 15 20 25 10 5
2000 25 15 20 25 10 5
**Rather than ranking the schools in each subcategory and then weighting each rank, the top school in 
each category was assigned a score of 100% and other schools were assigned scores relative to it, 
whichwere then summed.
Appendix B. Changes in Methodology (1990-2000)
(Items in bold indicate methodology change)
*Prior to 1996, only graduation rate was considered.  In 1996, the weighting of graduation rate decreased 
to 20% and retention rank was assigned a weight of 5%.
APPENDIX C-1 
USNWR – 1994 
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